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"Pro football is like nuclear warfare.
There are no winners, only survivors."1
Frank Gifford recognized, as do the majority of professional
athletes, that certain athletic activities are violent and dangerous.
Violent physical contact is inherent in both hockey and football. A
brief observation of either will reveal "violence and intimidation in
excess of that permitted by the rules. . .becoming integral parts
of strategy' and thus truly a part of the games.
Although some people object to the presence of any violence in
professional sports, most sports fans tolerate, and some even enjoy
legitimate aggressive play and the attendant violent physical con-
tact. Conversely, few people would contend that unlimited violence
is appropriate in athletic competition. "The mere act of putting on
a uniform and entering the sports arena should not serve as a li-
1. R. FITZHENRY, BARNES & NOBLE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 278 (2d ed. 1986) (quoting
former football star Frank Gifford).
2. Note, Tort Liability for Players in Contact Sports, 45 UMKC L. REv. 119, 129
(1976).
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cense" to injure, maim, or kill your opponent.s The agreement at
these polar extremes, however, masks the difficulties that arise
when one attempts to demarcate the boundary between legitimate
aggressive play and excessive violence.
Law suits pertaining to injuries sustained during athletic com-
petition are not a particularly recent phenomenon. A 1915 case,
Douglas v. Converse, involved a suit for an injury incurred by a
spectator during a polo match. Violence in sports recently has re-
ceived increased attention in the legal community because of the
dramatic increases in sports-related injuries.5 Currently, over sev-
enteen million Americans sustain athletic injuries requiring medi-
cal attention each year. As the number of injuries grows, the num-
ber of sports violence cases before the courts also grows, creating
an acute need for more refined doctrines.
7
This article will examine the problem of violence in sports
generally and, in particular, the defenses used to avoid liability.8
The author will first consider the assumption of risk doctrine, and
conclude that the doctrine is not an appropriate defense to exces-
sive violence during an athletic competition.'
The author will then consider the consent doctrine as applied
to sporting events, and evaluate some of the scope of consent tests
that courts and plaintiffs have proposed.10 Finally, the author will
propose a two-stage consent test: First, the test screens out certain
egregious acts and creates for them a rebuttable presumption of
liability; second, a traditional foreseeability test is then applied
with specific guidelines to the remaining acts."
I. DEFENSES TO L I.rLiTY
Before one analyzes legal defenses to liability for tort-related
sports injuries, one must consider whether courts should apply the
same doctrines that they apply to most other tortious acts. People
view athletics as qualitatively different from other activities and as
3. Flakne & Caplan, Sports Violence and the Prosecution, TRIAL, Jan. 1977, at 33, 35.
4. 248 Pa. 232, 93 A. 955 (1915).
5. Horrow, Violence in Professional Sports: Is it Part of the Game?, 9 J. LEGIS. 1
(1982).
6. Peterson & Smith, The Role of the Lawyer on the Playing Field, BARRISTER, Sum-
mer 1980, at 10, 10.
7. Horrow, supra note 5, at 1, 2.
8. See infra notes 12-67 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 34-67 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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being subject to a different set of rules.12 Judges frequently defer
to sports industry standards or league sanctions as the appropriate
measure of liability for injuries incurred during athletic competi-
tion.'8 Although athletic events are different from most other ac-
tivities, courts should apply basic tort concepts, e.g. reasonable-
ness, to behavior on the field as well as off." Actions occurring
during an athletic event must be considered in that context but
tort doctrines take into account the circumstances surrounding an
incident. Tort doctrines have evolved over hundreds of years and
embody the wisdom of many famed jurists; they are flexible
enough to adequately address the concerns of injured athletes.
The courts' failure to rigorously apply the appropriate legal
doctrines to tortious behavior in the sports arena has caused their
opinions to be unclear. Judges mention legal doctrines, but do not
apply them in a manner that will enable another judge to resolve a
future dispute efficiently. Most actions against one who injures an-
other in a sporting event are for negligence or battery and are ei-
ther civil or criminal. Nonetheless, courts discuss assumption of
risk, a defense to negligence, and consent, a defense to battery, in-
terchangeably. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals'5 was a case in
which the defendant injured the plaintiff by deliberately striking
him on the head, a battery, yet the court focused on assumption of
risk.16
If the defendant is accused of negligence, then the plaintiff
must prove the standard elements of negligence: duty, breach of
the duty, cause in fact, proximate cause, and injury. If the defend-
ant is accused of battery, the plaintiff must prove that the defend-
ant intended to inflict a harmful or offensive touching and actually
did inflict a harmful or offensive touching. 7 The harmful or offen-
sive touching is usually easy to prove in the sports injury cases, but
the intent to harm or offend is not. Athletes need to be emotion-
ally excited to perform well, and fact-finders have difficulty distin-
12. See Bodine, Rudy T Alters Rules of the Game, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 3, 1979, at 3, 3.
13. See Note, Compensating Injured Professional Athletes: The Mystique of Sport
Versus Traditional Tort Principles, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 971, 973 (1980); Comment, Disci-
pline in Professional Sports: The Need for Player Protection, 60 GEo. L.J. 771, 772 (1972).
14. See Note, supra note 13, at 973; Comment, supra note 13, at 772.
15. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979).
16. Id. at 356.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 13 (1965). See also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 9 (5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter cited as W. KEETON].
19861
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guishing between the intent to win and the intent to injure. 8 Fur-
thermore, the events occur so rapidly that witnesses, and even
participants, cannot recount their sequence accurately. 9
Once the plaintiff or prosecutor has succeeded in proving that
the defendant acted negligently or had the requisite intent, the de-
fendant has numerous defenses. In criminal trials, defendants fre-
quently assert self-defense to avoid liability. In civil suits, defend-
ants have several possible defenses, including assumption of risk,
consent, and contributory negligence. Although the assumption of
risk doctrine is currently in scholarly disfavor, courts have focused
upon it in some of the leading cases in sports liability.20
II. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The basis of the assumption of risk defense is that the plain-
tiff knew of a danger before it occurred and voluntarily assumed
the risk that the danger would occur.2 1 The assumption of risk doc-
trine has been explained as follows: "A plaintiff who voluntarily
assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless con-
duct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm."" When con-
fronted with a suit for an injury inflicted during an athletic compe-
tition, a defendant must argue that the plaintiff assumed the
inherent dangers of the sport, and thereby relieved the defendant
of certain obligations toward the plaintiff.
23
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals,2 4 probably the most re-
nowned case on sports violence, involved the assumption of risk
doctrine as applied to an incident in a professional football game.
Five seconds after the referee had whistled a play dead, Cincinnati
Bengal fullback "Booby" Clark struck Denver Bronco safety Dale
Hackbart in the back of the head with his forearm. The blow broke
three of Hackbart's vertebrae, caused other severe damage, and ef-
fectively ended Hackbart's career. The district court ruled that
professional football players assumed the risk of such injuries. It
18. Note, Tort Liability in Professional Sports: Battle in the Sports Arena, 57 N"n.
L. REV. 1128, 1134 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (Ont. 1970); Regina v. Green, 16
D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. 1970) (containing different and confused accounts of the same event).
20. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 435 F. Supp. at 356; Bourque v. Duplechin,
331 So.2d 40, 42-43 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty. Sch., 283 Pa.
Super. 155, 164, 423 A.2d 1035, 1040 (1980), rev'd, 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981).
21. W. KEETON, supra note 17, § 68, at 480.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tors, § 496A.
23. Horrow, supra note 5, at 7.
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noted that many similar fouls were overlooked (and, indeed, no
foul was called when Clark struck Hackbart) and that such inci-
dents were common. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the
trial court should have rigorously applied tort law doctrines:
"[T]here are no principles of law which allow a court to rule out
certain tortious conduct by reason of general roughness of the
game .... "25 The court concluded that Hackbart had not as-
sumed the risk of conduct that was intended to injure and was
outside the customs of the game of football.
The Louisiana Supreme Court applied the assumption of risk
defense to an incident in a softball game in Bourque v.
Duplechin.26 During a softball game, Duplechin intentionally ran
into Bourque, the second baseman, to prevent a double play. Such
conduct would normally be within the rules or custom, but the sec-
ond baseman was standing five feet from second base at the time
of the collision. In affirming the trial court, the appeals court held
that, although Bourque may
have assumed the risk of an injury resulting from standing in
the base path and being spiked by someone sliding into second
base .... Bourque did not assume the risk of Duplechin going
out of his way to run into him at full speed when Bourque was
five feet away from the base.27
The court limited the risks that participants assume to "risks inci-
dental to that particular activity which are obvious and foresee-
able," 8 and specifically excluded the risk that opponents would act
"in an unexpected or unsportsmanlike way with a reckless lack of
concern for others participating." 9
In Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District,"
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the assumption of risk
doctrine entirely. Howard Rutter, a sixteen year old boy, was
blinded in one eye while playing jungle football under the supervi-
sion of his high school football coach. The court found that Rutter
had not contemplated losing sight in one eye, and, thus, did not
assume that risk. The court also found that his decision to partici-
pate in the game of jungle football was not voluntary; Rutter vol-
untarily decided to play high school football, but the coach com-
25. 601 F.2d at 520.
26. 331 So.2d at 41.
27. Id. at 42.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981).
1986]
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pelled him to play jungle football. After finding that the
assumption of risk doctrine did not apply to Rutter, the court pro-
ceeded to abolish the doctrine entirely. 1 In the court's opinion, the
assumption of risk doctrine merely duplicated the concepts of
scope of duty and contributory negligence. Furthermore, the doc-
trine was confusing to apply. The court concluded that "[b]ecause
of its ambiguity the phrase 'assumption of risk' is a hazardous legal
tool. As a means of instructing a jury, it is bound to create confu-
sion. It should therefore be discarded.
'3 2
Pennsylvania is not alone in discarding the assumption of risk
doctrine; at least nineteen other states have abolished the doctrine
and others have restricted its use.3  The reasons usually cited are
similar to those listed in Rutter; the doctrine is confusing and does
not add much to contributory negligence. If the risk posed by de-
fendant's conduct is unreasonable, then accepting that risk is un-
reasonable, and the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. If a rea-
sonable person would have accepted the risk, then the defendant
should not be liable. In states that have adopted comparative neg-
ligence, assumption of risk causes additional harm by defeating the
legislative intent to apportion liability among partially blamewor-
thy parties.
The misleading nature of the assumption of risk doctrine be-
comes apparent when one examines its implications. If person A
assumes certain, risks attendant with proposed conduct by person
B, A is agreeing to relieve B of liability for that conduct. Assuming
A is a reasonable person, he intends only to authorize B to act
reasonably. If B acts reasonably, however, then he should not be
liable at all, and should not need to assert the assumption of risk
defense. If, on the other hand, B acts unreasonably, then he should
not be able to avoid liability.
Thus, courts should avoid analyzing sports violence cases
under the assumption of risk doctrine. Although the doctrine may
produce a desirable result when applied correctly, such skillful ap-
plication is rare. The elements of the doctrine, knowledge of the
risk and voluntary assumption of it, are subjective and therefore
31. Id. at 606, 437 A.2d at 1209.
32. Id. (quoting Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 72 (1943) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)).
33. Other states to abolish assumption of risk are: Alaska, California, Delaware, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Rut-









The logical way to evaluate sports injury cases is in terms of
consent. Certainly, when one decides to participate in an athletic
competition, one consents to any touching that is permitted by the
rules. When one participant's conduct strays outside of the rules,
however, the consent of the other participants becomes less cer-
tain. The major problem confronting the courts in sports violence
cases is determining the scope of the participant's consent.
For example, if one person were walking along a wall and a
stranger lowered his shoulder and drove the first person into the
wall, the stranger would probably have committed a battery. If, on
the other hand, a hockey player did that same act, he might not be
liable for the battery because hockey players consent to being
checked according to the rules. To determine whether the hockey
player had consented, a court would have to examine hockey rules.
If the act violated the rules, the court would then have to evaluate
whether a hockey player's consent included the act in question.
Commentators and courts have proposed numerous solutions
to the consent problem. Each has some advantages and some dis-
advantages, but none has gained widespread acceptance. The fol-
lowing section contains a description of the leading proposals.
A. Scope-of-Consent Test
Dean Prosser limits the defendant's privilege to "the conduct
to which the plaintiff consents, or at least to acts of a substantially
similar nature." Participants consent to physical contact that is
normally part of the game, or to similar contact. If the defendant
engages in intentional conduct that is substantially different from
that to which the plaintiff consented, then he may be liable for the
resulting injury. In determining the scope of consent, the court
should consider such factors as whether the sport was a contact
sport and whether the defendant's conduct was of the type nor-
mally occurring in that sport."'
Although the scope-of-consent test seems logical and sensible,
it does little but restate the problem. The court still must deter-
mine whether the plaintiff consented to the particular act of the
defendant. Although the plaintiff's consent to participate might be
34. W. KzzTON, supra note 17, § 18, at 103.
35. Horrow, supra note 5, at 9.
1986]
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explicit, any consent to the defendant's behavior must be implied.
The test provides little objective criteria for determining whether a
particular act was within the scope of the plaintiff's consent.
B. Rules-of-the-Game Test
The rules-of-the-game test is embodied in section 50 of the
Restatement of Torts, which states:
Taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to such
bodily contacts ... as are permitted by its rules or usages. Par-
ticipating in such a game does not manifest consent to contacts
which are prohibited by rules or usages of the game if such rules
or usages are designed to protect the participants and not
merely to secure the better playing of the game as a test of skill.
This is true although the player knows that those with or
against whom he is playing are habitual violators of such rules.3'
After separating the rules into safety rules and playing rules, the
test uses the safety rules as a strong indication of the parameters
of consent. An Illinois court applied the rules-of-the-game test in
Nabozny v. Barnhill.3 7 The defendant and the plaintiff were both
participants in a soccer game. The plaintiff, a goalie, was kneeling
in the penalty area holding the ball when the defendant kicked
him in the head. The rules of the game expressly prohibited any
player from making contact with the goalkeeper when he is in pos-
session of the ball in the penalty area. In finding the defendant
liable for the plaintiff's injuries, the court established the bright
line standard that when the rules contain "a safety rule. . . which
is primarily designed to protect players from serious injury, a
player is then charged with a legal duty to every other player on
the field to refrain from conduct proscribed by a safety rule."88
The rules-of-the-game test has the advantage of being objec-
tive. Before entering a game, players can determine to what they
are consenting, and courts can evaluate actions consistently and
efficiently. The problem with the test is that it oversimplifies the
problem. One could violate a safety rule without intentionally try-
ing to injure one's opponent or without being negligent. For exam-
ple, the prohibition against clipping in football is a safety rule
designed to prevent leg injuries. Clipping frequently occurs in pro-
fessional football games, often without malice and sometimes with-
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 50 comment b (1965).
37. 31 IIl. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
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out carelessness. Thus, a rule that imposes liability for every clip
would be overinclusive. Nonetheless, the rules-of-the-game test
provides a good indication of whether an act is within the partici-
pant's implied consent.
C. Scope-of-Team-Goals Test
One commentator"9 proposed a variation of the scope-of-the-
rules test employed in Nabozny v. Barnhill. ° This test questions
whether the violent act was in furtherance of one of the team's
objectives with respect to the sport involved. The commentator of-
fers two examples to illustrate the proposed test. The spearing of
an offensive ball carrier in a football game after the referee has
blown the play dead would result in liability because no team ob-
jective is furthered by a hit after the play is over. Conversely, a
reckless clipping during a play would not result in liability because
a block during a play is in furtherance of team objectives.41
In support of this proposal, the commentator offers two ratio-
nales.2 First, actions in furtherance of team goals, even if reckless,
are foreseeable and inherent risks of sports.
Second, a professional athlete does not assume the risk of reck-
less conduct in violation of a safety rule which is not in further-
ance of team or player goals with respect to the game. Rather,
such conduct is only a personal and flagrant disregard of the
duty each player owes to one another to refrain from needless
violence.4
3
This test provides a good indication of whether a participant con-
sents to a particular violent act. The problem with the rule is that
a strict application will often yield unjust results. Intentionally in-
jurious or grossly reckless acts should create liability regardless of
the team's objectives. Conversely, an accidental injury should not
automatically become the source of liability merely because it did
not further a team objective.
D. Magnitude-of-the-Act Test
The Provincial Court of Ottawa-Carleton adopted the magni-
39. Note, Judicial Scrutiny of Tortious Conduct in Professional Sports: Do Profes-
sional Athletes Assume the Risk of Injuries Resulting From Rule Violations? Hackbart v.
Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 17 CAL. W.L. R.v. 149 (1980).
40. 31 IIl. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
41. Note, supra note 39, at 165-66.
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tude-of-the-act test in Regina v. Maki.4" This test implies that
players consent to a threshold level of violence, both within and
outside of the rules. Violence that exceeds this level results in lia-
bility for the actor. "[A]l1 players, when they step onto a playing
field or ice surface, assume certain risks and hazards of the sport
. . . .[b]ut. . .there is a question of degree involved, and no ath-
lete should be presumed to accept malicious, unprovoked or overly
violent attack. 4 5 Judge Bastin applied a similar test in Agar v.
Canning,46 reasoning that any injury inflicted in circumstances
showing an intent to cause serious injury to another, even under
provocation and in the excitement of the game, should fall outside
the scope of the consent.
4 7
As with the scope-of-consent test, the magnitude-of-the-act
test does little more than restate the problem. The court in Can-
ning admitted that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts
so it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide how the line is to be
drawn in every circumstance. '48 The court correctly recognized
that no single rule can yield an easy solution to every situation
that arises. However, the court should not conclude that every
judge should, in effect, develop his own criteria for every case. The
magnitude-of-the-act test is a good formulation of the problem,
not a solution.
E. Magnitude-of-the-Harm Test
In 1970, the U.S. National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws proposed a solution designed to "provide a defense
to criminal prosecution whenever the injury inflicted or risked is a
'reasonably foreseeable hazard' of a sports competition. 4 9 The
Commission's proposal suggested that an athlete consented to acts
that were reasonably foreseeable.50
Richard Horrow, the chairman of the American Bar Associa-
tion Task Force on Sports Violence, criticized the magnitude-of-
the-harm test proposed by the Commission as being inadequate.51
According to Horrow, professional athletes are under great pres-
44. 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (1970).
45. Id. at 167. See generally Horrow, supra note 5, at 10.
46. 54 W.W.R, 302 (Q.B. Man. 1965), aff'd, 55 W.W.R. 384 (C.A. 1966).
47. 54 W.W.R. at 304.
48. Id.
49. Horrow, supra note 5, at 10 (quoting from U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING Pims, 851 (1970)).
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sure to be violent while on the field, and under equally great pres-
sure not to complain about violent acts that they suffer. Horrow
states that because of this pressure, "an athlete may enter a game
with knowledge of potential harm, but be powerless to do anything
about it. Surely he cannot be deemed to consent to exceptional
violence merely because he can foresee it."52
Although Horrow's criticism of the magnitude-of-the-harm
test at first seems reasonable, one could argue that he has misin-
terpreted the test. Horrow contends that one should not be
deemed to consent to violent contact because one can foresee it;
the test really states that if one can foresee the violent act, then
one consents when one decides to play in spite of the known risk.
When Horrow states that the athlete is "powerless" to do anything
about the risk, he is wrong; the athlete can abstain from participa-
tion. Athletes decide to participate in athletic events voluntarily. If
they want to avoid a risk that is the foreseeable result of the deci-
sion to play a particular sport, then they should decline to play. If
an athlete feels that the sport is too dangerous, then he should try
to change the nature of the game or change the rules. He should
not be able to participate, then complain that the predictable risk
did, in fact, occur.
To illustrate the distinction, imagine that everyone who
played hockey had his nose broken. A broken nose would be an
entirely foreseeable result of the decision to play hockey. Someone
who desired very much to play hockey may decide that the pleas-
ure was worth a broken nose, and play in a game. Although he
regrets that he will suffer a broken nose, he knows the future for
his nose when he enters the game. He may abhor the violence, but
he should not be able to sue when the inevitable occurs. Unless the
plaintiff outwardly manifests his lack of consent to specific con-
duct, the defendant should be able to assume that the plaintiff
consents to all reasonably foreseeable contact.
Another attribute of the Commission's proposal is that it fo-
cuses on objective criteria. Some tests focus on the implied consent
of the plaintiff, or at least of a reasonable plaintiff. The only objec-
tive indications of the acts to which the plaintiff impliedly con-
sents are the acts that normally occur during that sport. Thus, the
focus of the test should be the game itself, not the plaintiff's state
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F. Effectiveness-of-Consent Test
When the state charges the defendant with criminal battery,
the defendant's right to assert the consent defense may be limited
by the effectiveness-of-consent test. In some instances, states re-
fuse to allow persons to consent to certain crimes in order to con-
trol serious crime or to ensure the protection of the victims.5 3 The
Court of Appeals of New Mexico in State v. Fransua held that the
public interest in preventing violent acts justified eliminating en-
tirely the consent defense to the crime of aggravated battery."
Similarly, in Regina v. Maki, the Ottawa-Carleton Provincial Court
held "[n]o sports league, no matter how well organized or self-po-
liced it may be, should thereby render the players in that league
immune from criminal prosecution." 55
Rather than a definition of a player's implied consent, the ef-
fectiveness-of-consent test allows a court to disregard the consent
element and instead, focus on the egregiousness of the violent act.
No matter how violent an activity typically is, participants cannot
view their opponent's decision to play as a license to commit
crimes. This doctrine promotes important principles, and simpli-
fies the court's analysis when presented with a particularly violent
act; the court can merely find the act too violent to consent to, and
avoid analyzing. the particular sport for its customary violence.
IV. OTHER DEFENSES
A. Self-Defense
A person is generally privileged to use such force as reasonably
appears necessary to defend himself against an apparent threat of
imminent unlawful violence." The availability of self-defense de-
pends on the facts of each case, but a defendant will probably fail
if a significant amount of time elapses between the initial violence
or threat and the defendant's retaliation or retreat. Furthermore,
while most courts permit the self-protection defense where retreat
is not feasible, application of the doctrine to athletic competitions
is dubious because retreat is possible in most situations which oc-
cur on the playing field. 57 Even if the situation does permit the use
53. The most common example is the doctrine preventing defendants from asserting
the consent defense to statutory rape.
54. 85 N.M. 173, 510 P.2d 106 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).
55. 14 D.L.R.3d at 167.
56. W. KEETON, supra note 17, § 19, at 125.
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of force for self-protection, the defendant is limited to the mini-
mum amount of force necessary to avoid the bodily harm.58
The defendants in Regina v. Maki and Regina v. Green suc-
cessfully employed the self-defense doctrine in criminal prosecu-
tions arising out of an incident in a hockey game between the Bos-
ton Bruins and the St. Louis Blues.59 The fight started when
Wayne Maki grabbed Ted Green's jersey; soon after the players
were swinging their sticks at each other. In Regina v. Maki," the
court held that once Maki claimed self-defense, he could be con-
victed only if there was no doubt that he was not acting in self-
defense. The court found that the evidence was confusing, and
consequently, that the prosecution did not prove Maki's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.61 Having found Maki authorized to de-
fend himself, the court next examined the amount of force Maki
used. The court was lenient to Maki; although he raised his stick
above his head and swung it down on Green's head, the court
found that Maki merely "fail[ed] to measure with nicety the de-
gree of force necessary to ward off the attack and inflict[ed] serious
injury thereby."' 2 In Regina v. Green, the court did not analyze
the self-defense claim in detail, but held it did "not think Mr.
Green was doing anything more in the circumstances than protect-
ing himself." 8 Thus, the self-defense doctrine is flexible enough
that a court can exercise considerable control over the outcome of
a case by varying the rigor of its analysis. The defendant's success
may depend more on the reasoning of the court than on the actual
facts.
B. Provocation Defense
Few jurisdictions recognize the provocation defense, but occa-
sionally a defendant contends that the plaintiff provoked his vio-
lent acts.64 Those jurisdictions that recognize the provocation de-
fense generally consider the doctrine as a mitigating factor only.15
The better approach is to limit consideration of the plaintiff's
provocative behavior to that sufficient to invoke the self-protection
58. W. KEETON, supra note 17, § 19, at 125-26.
59. Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (Ont. 1970); Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137
(Ont. 1970).
60. 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (1970).
61. Id. at 166.
62. Id.
63. Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137, 142 (Ont. 1970).
64. See Horrow, supra note 5, at 1, for a discussion of the provocation defense.
65. Id. See also Fraser v. Berkley, 7 Car. & P. 621, 624, 173 E.R. 272, 273, 274 (1836).
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defense. Just as the self-protection defense is limited to the mini-
mum amount of force necessary to protect oneself from bodily
harm, the provocation defense should not defeat liability unless
the provoking behavior is so violent that the defendant fears for
his safety. If that is the case, the self-protection defense will ade-
quately shield the defendant from liability. As the Manitoba court
held in Agar v. Canning, "[I]njuries inflicted in circumstances
which show a definite resolve to cause serious injury to another,
even where there is provocation" should result in liability."
C. Involuntary Reflex Defense
Some defendants have been more successful using the involun-
tary reflex defense than they have been using the provocation de-
fense. 67 To defeat the mens rea or intent element of criminal or
tortious battery, defendants argue that their violence was an invol-
untary reflex, not a deliberate act. 8 The defense succeeds because
intent is the most difficult element to prove in sports violence
cases. Sports violence is considered by participants as part of the
game and non-criminal. The high-pressured, emotional nature of
competitive sports is conducive to a player's losing control of
himself."
The policies embodied in the involuntary reflex defense are
just; one should not be liable for a reflexive reaction to some of the
volatile situations that arise in sporting events. However, these
policies are satisfactorily advanced by the traditional analyses. The
typical negligence test is whether the defendant acted as a reasona-
ble person would have under the circumstances. Thus, if the de-
fendant's reflexive reaction was reasonable, he can avoid liability.
If not, he should be liable. In a battery action, liability hinges upon
a showing of intent. The defendant's claim of involuntary reflex
should be a factor considered by the fact finder, not a determina-
tive element.
V. PROPOSAL
Sports violence encompasses a narrow group of situations. It
seems like the ideal area for a well-evolved doctrine, and the courts
have had numerous cases in which to develop one. Nonetheless,
66. 54 W.W.R. 302, 304 (Q.B. Man. 1965), aff'd, 55 W.W.R. 384, 386 (C.A. 1966).
67. A defendant successfully used the defense to disprove mens rea in State v. Forbes,
No. 63280 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., Aug. 12, 1975) (judgment for mistrial entered).
68. Id.
69. Horrow, supra note 5, at 11.
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the courts have produced several vague and confusing opinions
without a satisfactory solution. A court today faced with a sports
violence case would have little guidance; it would essentially have
to create its own doctrine.
An examination of the solutions proposed by commentators or
employed by the courts reveals that they fall into one of two cate-
gories. The first group merely restates the problem in slightly dif-
ferent terms but is so general that it provides no guidance to fu-
ture courts. The scope-of-consent test and the magnitude-of-the-
act test fail in this category. The second group makes the opposite
error and is too specific or narrow. Unfortunately, a test that
makes the fine distinction between an act that is within the im-
plied consent of all participants and an act that is outside of that
implied consent cannot be a simple "yes" or "no" test. Such tests
as the rules-of-the-game test or the scope-of-team-goals test will
inevitably be both underinclusive and overinclusive.
A compact, black-letter law approach in handling sports vio-
lence cases is neither obtainable nor desirable. Determining the
precise range of acts to which a participant impliedly consents
when he steps onto the playing field is a difficult task. Instead of
proposing a consent test with a single element or question to be
answered in the positive or the negative, the courts need to de-
velop a reasoned analysis that will ultimately affect desired
behavior.
This paper proposes that the analysis consist of two levels. At
the first level, the test would create a presumption of liability
under certain circumstances. This presumption would arise under
either of two situations. The first is when the challenged act vio-
lated a safety rule. A court would apply this test in a similar man-
ner to the rules-of-the-game test, except that a finding of a safety
rule violation does not automatically produce liability, only a re-
buttable presumption of liability. In this manner, the defendant
has the opportunity to show that he acted neither intentionally nor
negligently and should not be liable.
The second situation occurs when the defendant's act did not
further team objectives, employing the concepts of the scope-of-
team-goals test. A finding that the challenged act did not further
team goals would create a rebuttable presumption of liability. The
defendant could defeat this presumption only by showing that he
acted neither intentionally nor negligently.
Courts would apply the second level of analysis only if neither
element of the first level triggers a rebuttable presumption of lia-
bility or if the defendant rebuts the presumption if one is trig-
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gered. At the second level, the court examines the act to determine
how foreseeable it was, i.e., how much was it a normal part of the
activity. In order to aid future courts and to help participants gov-
ern their behavior and limit their exposure, the courts could de-
velop a nonexclusive list of factors that they will consider in deter-
mining whether an act is foreseeable. Some examples of factors
courts could use are: whether the play was in progress when the
contact occurred, or if not, how much time had elapsed since the
end of the play; whether the activity directly preceding the contact
was frenzied and somewhat violent; how violent the sport is in gen-
eral; how frequently the particular type of contact occurs; and how
similar the contact is to contact that is within the rules.
The policy objective of the test is to create an efficient and
objective analysis so that both courts and athletes can understand
the law and act accordingly. The first level of the analysis identi-
fies the "easy" cases and avoids a lengthy consideration of the
sport in general. The test recognizes, however, that rigid applica-
tion of the first level elements may sometimes result in injustice.
Thus, it creates only a presumption and allows the defendant an
opportunity to exculpate himself. The second level structures the
arguments of the parties and simplifies the comparison for the
bench. A list of factors will focus the parties' arguments on the
factors that the particular court considers important. The court
can then evaluate each side's argument, factor by factor, and more
easily recognize the stronger position.
The test should not be static at either level. If courts or com-
mentators recognize another category of acts that should trigger
the presumption of liability, the category should be included in the
first level analysis. The more cases courts can resolve at the first
level, the greater the judicial resources saved. Similarly, courts
should continuously evaluate the list of factors at the second level.
Each time a court applies its version of the test to another
case involving a particular sport, the analysis for that sport will
become more refined. The previous court will have determined how
dangerous the sport is, what kind of contact is inherent in that
sport, and similar information for the other factors. Thus, future
courts will benefit from the labor of earlier courts, instead of start-
ing anew as they currently do.
VI. APPLICATION OF PROPOSED ANALYSIS
In order to illustrate the proposed analysis it will be applied to
a well-known fact pattern. By varying the facts slightly, one can
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see that the proposal quickly resolves the clearcut cases and struc-
tures the analysis for the moie complicated factual situations.
The best known sports violence fact pattern describes the
blow that "Booby" Clark struck to the back of Dale Hackbart's
head. 70 Following an interception, Hackbart, who had been on de-
fense, blocked Clark, who had been on offense. Hackbart fell to the
ground following his block. He then arose from the ground to a
kneeling position and watched the remainder of the play. Five
seconds after the referee blew the whistle, Clark, in frustration but
without the intent to injure, struck Hackbart on the back of the
head with his forearm. Hackbart sustained serious injuries from
the blow.
The proposed analysis would resolve this dispute quickly.
Clark's behavior triggers the presumption of liability under both
prongs of the first level of the test. First, the fact that the play had
been over for a substantial period of time (five seconds) automati-
cally indicates that the blow did not further any team objective.
Second, the blow violated Article 1, Item 1, Subsection C of the
National Football League's rules, providing that: "All players are
prohibited from striking on the head, face or neck with the heel,
back or side of the hand, wrist, forearm, elbow or clasped hands.
'71
This rule is clearly a safety rule; it does not control the flow of the
game, and prohibits certain violent behavior at any time. Thus, the
proposal would resolve efficiently the actual incident in Hackbart
with the same result as that reached by the United States Circuit
Court for the Tenth Circuit. Unless Clark produced strong evi-
dence rebutting the liability presumption, a court would rule in
favor of Hackbart, perhaps conducting a hearing only on the dam-
ages issue if the parties agreed on the facts.
If the play was still in progress when Clark struck Hackbart,
and if the National Football League rules did not prohibit such
blows explicitly, the outcome would probably be similar. A court
would examine Clark's behavior to determine if he intended to fur-
ther any team objective. The court would probably find that
Clark's behavior did not further any team objective; Hackbart was
kneeling on the ground and the ball was not near him. It was ex-
tremely unlikely that Hackbart would participate further in the
play, so Clark's blow could not have achieved anything but
70. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 435 F.Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d
516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979). See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying
text.
71. Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 521.
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Hackbart's injury.
If, however, Hackbart had just moved from the ground to the
kneeling position and was near the ball, a court might not create
any presumption of liability. If the court determined that Clark's
blow was reasonably intended to prevent him from re-entering the
play, then it would further a team objective, and would not trigger
the presumption of liability. Under those circumstances, the court
would proceed to the second level of the analysis.
In the second level of the analysis, a court would compare
Clark's blow to the customary level of violence in the National
Football League, and thereby determine whether the blow was rea-
sonably foreseeable. A court using the factors listed in the proposal
discussed in the previous section would first determine whether
play was in progress when the alleged battery occurred. Under the
present hypothetical facts, play was in progress when Clark struck
Hackbart. This factor would tend to exculpate Clark. Next, the
court should consider whether the activity preceeding the blow was
particularly frenzied. In our hypothetical situation, the activity was
probably not frenzied; Clark walked over to Hackbart and deliber-
ately struck him. If Clark had delivered the blow during a pile-up,
the outcome of this factor might be different. Clark's blow in the
open field would tend to inculpate him. Third, the court should
assess how violent professional football is. Football is undoubtedly
an extremely violent sport. The generally violent nature of football
would tend to exculpate Clark. Fourth, the court should examine
the frequency with which similar acts occur in professional football
games. This is a factual question for which expert testimony is ap-
propriate. Finally, the court would consider the similarity between
Clark's blow and acts within the rules. The outcome under this
factor is uncertain; much more powerful blows are routinely struck
in football games, but not to the back of the head while the player
is kneeling down and facing away.
After examining these individual factors, the court must then
decide whether Hackbart should have foreseen that he might incur
such an injury. Unfortunately, the court cannot merely count the
factors militating for and against liability; the factors are not all of
equal importance. Furthermore, a finding that a sport was ex-
tremely violent would be more significant than a finding that a
sport was moderately violent, even though both findings would
tend to exculpate the defendant. The court must balance and
weigh the factors for each case.
The second level of the analysis seems complicated. In fact, it
probably is complicated, but only because the hypothetical facts
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were designed to make the analysis difficult. Even though the anal-
ysis was difficult, it had two important beneficial attributes. First,
the court had a structured analysis to apply to a complicated situa-
tion. It had a list of factors and was unlikely to focus on one aspect
of the case and ignore others. The attorneys for both parties would
know which factors the court would consider, and would concen-
trate on those factors. The court would therefore have arguments
from each party on each factor and could more easily evaluate the
strengths of each argument.
Second, because future courts will apply the same factors,
those courts can use the findings of earlier courts to avoid a
lengthy analysis of some of the factors. The second court to try a
case involving the National Football League may not need to hear
expert testimony about the level of violence in professional football
because it can refer to the transcript or opinion from the earlier
trial.
VII. CONCLUSION
The analysis proposed in this paper is designed to achieve effi-
ciency and consistency. It is efficient because it avoids a lengthy
analysis where such an analysis is unnecessary. It promotes consis-
tency because it enumerates factors to be applied to every case.
Athletes, attorneys, and judges can determine what behavior al-
most automatically will result in liability, and they can determine
what factors are important in evaluating less blatant behavior.
The proposed analysis probably would not greatly reduce the
level of violence in professional athletics; a stricter judicial posture
is unlikely to overcome the intense pressures on professional ath-
letes to compete aggressively regardless of the injuries they incur
or cause. Nonetheless, a consistent and explicit judicial doctrine
will compensate those athletes who sustain injuries from the exces-
sive violence of an opponent and might eliminate the more ex-
treme examples of violent behavior. If players had a better sense of
the limits of permissible behavior and a heightened awareness of
the liabilities of exceeding those limits, they might curb their tem-
pers and control their impulses.
The solution to violence in athletics cannot come solely from
the courtroom; it must include a restructuring of the rules of the
individual sports and an altering of the attitudes of the public, the
league, and the players towards violence. Acts of violence occur
regularly in sports only because of years of tolerance. To reduce
the violence, society must first redefine the boundaries of accept-
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able violence in athletic competitions. Only then can the courts im-
pose sanctions on those who cross those boundaries.
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